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International law on groundwater is nearly nonexistent. This situation
complicates the ability of nations to resolve disputes over shared
groundwater resources. First, the legal vacuum leaves room for a wide
assortment of claims. Second, emerging legal principles regarding
groundwater are too weak to be legally binding because nations do not
as yet recognize them as law.
Several reasons account for this lack of law. Competing doctrines in
the area of international environmental law have created a stalemate
that impedes groundwater law formation. Because state boundaries
cannot restrict water flow, any effective regime for groundwater must
necessarily involve international regulation. However, most states cling
to old notions of territorial sovereignty and accordingly resist such regu-
lation. Additionally, scientific uncertainty regarding the nature of
groundwater makes it difficult to allocate groundwater based on interna-
tional law.
This Note illustrates the need to improve the international legal
regime governing transboundary groundwater by analyzing the recent
dispute between the U.S. and Mexico over shared groundwater
resources. Mexico has objected to a proposed U.S. project to reline the
bottom of the All American Canal in Southern California, fearing that
the project will reduce or stop the substantial flow of groundwater to
Mexico's northern regions. Both Mexico and the U.S. claim a legal right
to the water.1 This dispute epitomizes the type of crisis that can occur in
a world of diminishing natural resources.
In analyzing this dispute, this Note will first present the applicable
international law, including both the applicable treaties and customary
international law. It will next explain why the customary international
law of groundwater is in such a rudimentary stage. Third, this Note will
1. Canal Project Sets Off U.S.-Mexico Clash Over Waterfor Border Regions, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 1, 1989, § 1, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Canal Project]. Groundwater is water that
flows underground. It can derive from a surface source or can terminate on the sur-
face. International groundwater is water that flows underground across international
boundaries. See Frownfelter, International Component of Texas Water Law, 18 ST MARY'S
L.J. 481, 508 (1986-87).
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apply what little definitive international environmental law there is to
the U.S.-Mexican dispute. Finally, this Note will borrow from U.S.
domestic law to resolve the dispute between Mexico and the U.S.
I. Background
A. The Dispute between the U.S. and Mexico
The event igniting the current dispute between Mexico and the U.S. was
an American proposal to reline the bottom of the All American Canal
(the "Canal") which carries water, primarily for irrigation purposes,
from the Colorado River into California's Imperial Valley.2 The Canal
was completed in the late 1930s with an earthen bottom and has annu-
ally lost approximately half its total volume, about 32.6 billion gallons,
from seepage through this bottom.3 Lost water flows underground
through a large sandy area that runs parallel to the Mexican border and
eventually reaches Northern Mexico. There, more than 700 wells wait
to recover the water.4 Because of this water source, the Mexicali Valley
in Northern Mexico "has become a major producer and exporter of
wheat, cotton, vegetables, and animal fodder."5 It is one of Mexico's
most productive agricultural zones.
6
In November of 1988, the U.S. "Congress authorized the Depart-
ment of the Interior to reline sixty-six miles of the Canal, west of
Andrade, California, with concrete 'in order to reduce the seepage of
water.' "7 Soon thereafter the Department began a "1.5 mile 'prototype
relining project' on the Coachella Branch of the Canal in Southern Cali-
fornia."'8 The impetus behind this relining project is the concern that
there will not be enough water to sustain the rapidly growing popula-
tions of Los Angeles and San Diego. California's total population has
risen from 10,586,000 in 1950 to 27,663,000 in 1987. Population pro-
jections estimate that California's total population will reach 31,463,000
by the year 1995. 9 The growth in Southern California has been and will
continue to be explosive. For example, the population of Los Angeles
rose by nearly 100,000 from 1988 to 1989.10 San Diego's population
also increased by approximately the same amount, growing from
2,328,300 to 2,418,200.11
Predictably, Mexico is extremely concerned about the Canal pro-
2. Canal Project, supra note 1, § 1, at 3, col. 1; see also Canal Lining Could Bring
Southland Water Bonanza, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 1988, § 1, at 3, col. I [hereinafter
Bonanza].
3. Canal Project, supra note 1, § 1, at 3, col. 1; Bonanza, supra note 2, § 1, at 3, col.
1.





9. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF UNITED STATES, at 18 (1989).
10. Id at 24. Los Angeles population rose from 8,551,500 to 8,650,300.
11. Id.
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ject. 12 A Mexican government study estimates that agriculture con-
sumes 94.5% of the water in Northern Baja California.' 3 In addition,
urban and industrial sectors rely heavily on the local groundwater.'
4
According to Sergio Amaya Brondo, a representative of Mexico's
National Water Commission in Mexicali, if the U.S. implements the
relining project, it will mean the end of the Mexicali Valley.' 5
Mexico's national population is also experiencing rapid growth,
increasing by approximately 20 million between 1970 and 1980 alone. 16
Population estimates predict that the Mexican population will increase
by 30 to 40 million inhabitants between 1980 and the year 2000, and
that this increase will be highest in the border region. 17 Thus the
groundwater recovered from the Canal will become more crucial than
ever to Northern Mexico.
B. The Treaties
The U.S. and Mexico have several agreements relating to the waters
flowing between the two countries. 18 The U.S. is relying upon a 1944




16. Alba, Mexico's Southern Border: A Framework for Reference, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J.
749, 752 (1982).
17. Id. at 757. "Baja California has a substantial, largely untapped supply of
groundwater that is hydrolically related to the surface flow of the Colorado." Hear-
ings before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States on the Treaty with Mexico
Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1337
(1945). There is some scientific uncertainty over the source of this groundwater.
The American section of the International Boundary and Water Commission is at
this time only willing to say that the All American Canal (the "Canal") is losing water.
While it is likely that the Canal is the source of the Mexican groundwater, it is possi-
ble that the groundwater comes from another source. In that case, lining the Canal
would not stop the flow. Additionally, it is uncertain whether the Canal interferes
with naturally flowing groundwater or creates the groundwater for Mexico when it
brings the Colorado River water to Southern California. For the purposes of this
Note, I will assume that relining the Canal would stop the flow of groundwater and
that the Canal creates the groundwater from the Colorado River.
18. Among these agreements are the following:
1. Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio
Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 21, 1906, United States-Mexico, 34 Stat.
2953, T.S. 455.
2. Convention for the Rectification of the Rio Grande in the El-Paso-Juarez Valley,
Feb. 1, 1933, United States-Mexico, 48 Stat. 1621, T.S. 864.
3. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, and Supplementary Protocol, Nov. 1-Feb. 3, 1944,
United States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994.
4. Agreement Concerning Rediversion of Rio Grande Waters Allocated to Mexico
under the Convention of 1906, June 24-Nov. 10, 1987, United States-Mexico,
T.I.A.S. No. -.
Most recent agreements relate to transboundary water pollution:
1. Agreement Approving Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission Setting Forth a Permanent and Definitive Solution to the Interna-
tional Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30, 1973, United
States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708.
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Treaty which apportioned the waters of the Rio Grande, Colorado, and
Tijuana rivers. Mexico, in turn, is relying upon a 1973 agreement which
addressed a salinity problem in the Colorado River.' 9
Treaties do not necessarily reflect international law. A state can
waive certain rights by treaty. 20 A state, however, may not enter a treaty
to violate international law. For example, two states may not contract to
invade a third state.2 ' Therefore, the agreements between the U.S. and
Mexico do not necessarily embody international law. Nevertheless,
international agreements are legally binding on the parties, much in the
same way that a contract would be.2 2 Thus, treaties between the U.S.
and Mexico bind both countries as parties.
In 1944 the U.S. and Mexico entered into a Treaty on Utilization of
the Waters of the Colorado and Rio Grande23 (the "Treaty") to fix and
to define the rights of the two countries with respect to the waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of a portion of the Rio Grande.
24
The Treaty's purpose was to obtain the optimal utilization of the
waters. 25 Article 3 embodies this principle by prioritizing intended uses
for the waters. 26 By giving some uses priority over others, such as
domestic use over recreational, the Treaty limits waste and ensures that
the water will serve the more crucial needs of society.
27
The Treaty allots to Mexico an amount that is equal to nearly ten
2. Minute 276 of the International Boundary and Water Commission Re: Sewage
Disposal from Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora Exceeding the Capacities
Allocated to the United States and Mexico at the Nogales International Sewage
Treatment Plant, July 26, 1988, United States-Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. -.
19. Canal Project, supra note 1, § 1, at 3, col. 1. The U.S. is relying upon a treaty
relating to water utilization of the Colorado, Tijuana, and Rio Grande Rivers and
supplementary protocol, Nov. 14-Feb. 3, 1944, United States-Mexico, 59 Stat. 1219,
T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter the Treaty].
Mexico is relying upon Approved Minute 242 of the International Boundary and
Water Commission setting forth a permanent and definitive solution to the interna-
tional problem of the salinity of the Colorado River, Aug. 30, 1973, United States-
Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708 [hereinafter Agreement].
20. T. BURGENTHAL & H. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (1990).
21. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
"[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law.., from which no derogation is permitted." Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (1969), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C.
OLIVER & M. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYsTEM 254 (3d ed. Supp. 1988).
The International Law Commission's commentary to the draft article that became
Article 53 states that "the majority of the general rules of international law do not
have that character, and states may contract out of them by treaty." See Int'l Law
Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 61 AM.J. INT'L L. 263, 409 (1967).
22. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 26, reprinted at 245.
23. Treaty, supra note 19.
24. Id. at preamble
25. Id. at proclamation.
26. Id. at art. 3.
27. Part of the reason that the U.S. entered into this agreement was to pursue
better relations with Mexico. The U.S. had hoped that better relations would solve
other problems, such as compensation for American oil interests which Mexico had
previously expropriated. See Meyers, The Colorado Basin, in THE LAW oF INTERNA-
TIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 544 (1967).
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percent of the average annual flow of the Colorado river.28 This annual
quantity from the Colorado river averages 1.5 million acre feet.2 9 In
years when the U.S. has surplus water, Mexico can receive an additional
200,000 acre feet.30 The Treaty specifically states that the U.S. is under
no obligation to deliver more than 375,000 acre feet through the All
American Canal.
3 1
The Treaty provides that the U.S. must allow Mexico's allotted
share to flow to Mexico, except in conditions of extraordinary drought
or serious accident to the irrigation system in the U.S. which would
make delivery of the apportioned quantity difficult.3 2 Additionally, in
the event of extraordinary drought, the U.S. may reduce Mexico's water
by the same percentage as that reduced in the U.S.35
Since 1944 there have been several agreements relating to the water
flowing between the two countries.3 4 Most pertinent to the dispute is
the 1973 Agreement (the "Agreement") enforcing Minute 242 of the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), which
addresses the problem of increased salinity of the Colorado River result-
ing from a U.S. irrigation and drainage project.3 5 With an eye to
preventing future problems, the Agreement limits developments in the
border area that might adversely affect either country.3 6 Section 6 of
the Agreement states, "the U.S. and Mexico shall consult with each
other prior to undertaking any new development of either the surface or
28. Id. at 541. The Colorado River originates in a network small streams on the
western slope of the Colorado Rocky Mountains. Id. at 492. The Colorado River
borders Arizona and Mexico for about 20 miles, then runs through Mexico for
another 100 miles, where it becomes the border between Baja California and Sonora.
It then empties into the Gulf of California. Id at 489.
29. Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10. An acre foot is the volume of water needed
to cover an acre of land to a depth of one foot-approximately 325,851 gallons.
30. Id.
31. See Id. at art. 15 (schedule II). Article 4 of the Treaty apportioned the waters
of the Rio Grande. Although Mexico contributes approximately 70% of the waters of
the Rio Grande, the apportionment scheme divides the waters in half. Meyers, supra
note 25, at 561. The treaty later resolves this inequity by giving Mexico one half of
the waters of the Colorado although Mexico only contributes 10% to these waters.
Id at 541.
32. Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 10.
33. Id
34. See supra note 16.
35. Agreement, supra note 19. This agreement settled saline discharges from the
Wellton-Mohawk irrigation and drainage district. Until 1960, Mexico had received at
least an extra 400,000 acre feet of water per year, but after 1960 the U.S. reduced the
flow to the treaty specifications. This reduction in water combined with the saline
discharges doubled the salt content of the water going to Mexico from the Colorado
River. Mexico asked the U.S. for the release of more water to deconcentrate the salt,
but the U.S. refused. The agreement reached required the U.S. to take measures to
assure that byJuly 1, 1974, the water delivered to Mexico upstream from the Moreles
Dam would have an average annual salinity of approximately 115 parts per million
(plus or minus 30 parts per million) over the average annual salinity of the water
which arrives at the Imperial Dam, the diversion point for the U.S. F. GRAD, TRRA-
TISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 13.04, at 13-149 (1989).
36. Agreement, supra note 19, at § 6.
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groundwater resources, or undertaking substantial modifications of
present developments, in its own territory in the border area that might
adversely affect the other country." 37 The Agreement is one of the few
agreements in the world that actually addresses groundwater.3 8 In Sec-
tion 5 the Agreement limits groundwater pumping within five miles of
the Arizona-Sonora boundary near San Luis, Mexico, to 160,000 acre
feet per year.39
C. International Law
1. International Law on Groundwater
International custom becomes international law when it meets the
requirement of opiniojuris, when all states feel legally bound to obey that
practice. Broad adherence to the custom is not enough.40 As there is
almost a complete lack of law, custom, or institutional oversight address-
ing groundwater at the international level, 4 ' today's environment does
not even suggest a widely followed practice, let alone opiniojuris.
Transboundary groundwater law has only recently begun to
develop.42 Although in reality all water resources form an integrated
whole, legislation and international agreements still take a fragmented
approach to water resources. 43 For example, no international agree-
ments exist that incorporate groundwater in any significant way with
surface waters. This occurs despite the reality that surface waters feed
underground waters and vice versa.
44
Europe probably has the most mature groundwater law. European
countries are more aware of the interconnections between ground and
surface water than other countries. 45 Recent bilateral negotiations and
certain new water treaties show a growing tendency to recognize the
interconnections between water systems. 46 For instance, France and
Switzerland have recently signed an agreement on the groundwater
37. Id.
38. See Utton, The Development of International Groundwater Law, in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW 16 (1981).
39. Agreement, supra note 19, at § 5.
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter REST. 3RD].
41. See Utton, International Groundwater Management: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican
Frontier, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW at 159 (1981).
42. Utton, supra note 38, at 4. "[Rleferences to groundwater are scant and too
limited in scope to propose them in terms of customary law." Caponera & Alheri-
tiere, Principles for International Groundwater Law, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER
LAW, supra note 38, at 54.
43. Hayton, The Groundwater Legal Regime as Instrument of Policy Objectives and Man-
agement Requirements, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW, supra note 38, at 57-75.
44. See Comment to Article II of the Helsinki Rules on the Waters of Interna-
tional Rivers, adopted by the International Law Association at the 52nd Conference,
August 20, 1966 ("The drainage basin is an indivisible hydrolic unit .. "). Interna-
tional Law Association, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL WATERS at art. 11 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
45. See Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 42, at 48.
46. Id
VoL 24
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resources of the Lake Geneva Basin.4 7 Yet, even here the law is rudi-
mentary. In the few treaties discussing groundwater, the groundwater is
usually included as an aside to surface water allocation or pollution
problems rather than as an interconnected resource, significant in its
own right. Examples of this adjunctory inclusion of groundwater occur
in the references to groundwater made in the International Convention
on Lake Geneva and in the Netherlands-Federal Republic of Germany
Convention. 48 In addition, a 1972 Convention between Switzerland and
Italy dealing with the contamination of interboundary lakes from pol-
luted groundwater orders all steps to be taken to investigate this prob-
lem.4 9 Thus, even in Europe, where groundwater law is the most
developed, consistent groundwater practice is limited.
2. Reasons for the Dearth of Groundwater Law
There are several reasons for the dearth of groundwater law. First,
incentives are insufficient to persuade the international creation of
groundwater laws. Law usually develops out of necessity.50 The global
water shortage has not yet reached crisis proportions. In addition,
groundwater by definition is out of sight, contributing to public inatten-
tion to the topic.5 1 Second, as groundwater resources begin to dimin-
ish, law is beginning to form, but older conflicting principles of
territorial sovereignty impede its growth. Additionally, present institu-
tions lack the power to effectively manage groundwater resources and to
resolve disputes. Finally, scientific uncertainty also discourages new
groundwater law.5 2
a. Competing Ideologies Hamper Progress
Competing ideologies in the area of natural resources contribute to
inconsistent practices. Older notions of territorial sovereignty are by
definition incompatible with developing laws which recognize ground-
water's transboundary nature. According to strict territorial sover-
eignty, a state's territorial jurisdiction is absolute and exclusive. Other
states have no right to question the actions of a state within its own
territory.
These older notions of territorial sovereignty surface in documents
such as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962), which describes the "ina-
lienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and
resources in accordance with their national interests. s5 3 The theme of




50. See Hayton, supra note 43, at 60.
51. Teclaff & Teclaff, Transboundary Groundwater Pollution in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW 84 (1981).
52. Id.
53. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Annex, A/39 at 59 (1962).
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charter. 54 In light of this doctrine, an upstream state has the right to
exploit the water within its boundaries to the detriment of a downstream
state.
55
As a result of diminishing natural resources, competing doctrines
are challenging the notion of territorial sovereignty. Some believe that
certain natural resources are the common heritage of mankind.5 6 Fol-
lowing this belief, there is a growing trend to incorporate groundwater
into boundary or "shared" water treaties. This trend is visible in new
treaties, additions or amendments to older treaties, and joint interpreta-
tions of newer and older treaties. 5 7 Because water is a fugitive resource,
it does not stay neatly within territorial boundaries.58 Consequently,
laws based upon territorial sovereignty over water are contrary to
hydrolic reality. Due to this reality and the diminishing supplies of
groundwater, there is a growing movement in the international commu-
nity to view groundwater as part of an interconnected hydrolic system
that transcends state boundaries.
The vast majority of recommendations of U.N. conventions or spe-
54. See id. at 53, art. 2(4); see also Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
55. Riparian rights generally recognize that the owner of land overlying ground-
water has complete ownership of that water. See Greenman v. City of Fort Worth, 308
S.W. 2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1988).
The Harmon doctrine is often cited in support of the principle that states
have absolute sovereignty over water within their jurisdiction. The doctrine
holds that as long as there are no international laws governing the waters in
question, a state can freely dispose of its waters as it sees fit.
Lipper, Equitable Utilization, in The LAw OF INTERNANIONAL DRAINAGE BASINs 22-23
(1967).
56. Two General Assembly Resolutions relating to the resources of the areas of
the sea-bed and ocean floor are good examples of this development. First, the Mora-
torium Resolution, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 24-30) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969), was adopted on December 15, 1969. The vote was 64 to 28, with 28 absten-
tions. Most developed countries voted against it. G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR
Plenary A/7834. Part of the reason might have been that the resolution called for
states to refrain from "all activities of exploitation of the resources of the areas of the
sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national juris-
diction." Id Developed countries had the technology to extract the minerals and
may not have wanted to wait for the developing countries to catch up.
Second, most of the developed countries, including the U.S., voted for the Declara-
tion of Principles. General Assembly Resolution, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at
24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). It was adopted by a vote of 108-0-14. The resolution
contains in pertinent part:
1. [T]he sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as
the resources of the area are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States or
persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty
or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
57. Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 42, at 46. "In Africa, the 1964 Convention
and Statutes between Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria relating to the develop-
ment of the Chad Basin refer to the use of both surface and groundwater." Id. at 49;
see also infra pp. 8-9; and Agreement, supra note 19, at § 7.
58. Utton, supra note 38, at 9.
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cial international bodies are not legally binding,5 9 but they may be evi-
dence of emerging principles and concerns. Organizations such as these
have moved the farthest from the notions of absolute territorial control.
For instance, the International Law Association's rules, 60 created in Hel-
sinki, opt for a model of interconnected water sources. 6 1 The rules
include groundwater in international waters: "An international drain-
age basin is a geographical area extending over two or more states
determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus."
'62
The rules explicitly reject the unqualified right of overlying states to
make use of the groundwater as they see fit.6 3 Rather, the rules recom-
mend equitable utilization, stating that "[e]ach [basin] state is entitled,
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial
uses of waters in an international drainage basin." 6 4 The rules qualify
equitable utilization accordingly: "Equal and correlative rights of use
among the cobasin states does not mean that each such state will receive
an identical share in the uses of the waters."' 65 Instead, a country's rea-
sonable and equitable share depends upon weighing social, geographic
and demographic factors. 6 6 In addition, the use must be beneficial,
67
but "it need not be the most productive use.., nor need it utilize the
most efficient methods." 68 The rules recommend holding states "to a
duty of efficiency which is commensurate with their financial
resources." 6 9 Thus, the Helsinki Rules promote a global view of water
resources by suggesting that all states with affected interests have some
sort of say in water allocation.
Recent U.N. conferences also point to increasing international con-
cern and interest about groundwater. For example, the U.N. water con-
ference in 1977 at Mar Del Plata recommended that "countries sharing
water resources ... should review existing and available techniques for
managing shared water resources and cooperate in the establishment of
programs, machinery and institutions necessary for the coordinated
development of such resources." 70 The conference recommended
using groundwater aquifers in the form of collective and integrated sys-
tems, taking into account the regulation and use of surface water
59. T. BLUMENTHAL & H. MAIER, supra note 20, at 31.
60. Helsinki Rules, supra note 44.
61. Hayton, The Law of International Aquifers, 22 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 71, 77 (1982).
62. Helsinki Rules, supra note 44, at art. ii.
63. Id at comment to art. iv.
64. Id. at art. iv.
65. Id. at comment to art. iv.
66. Id. at art. v.
67. According to the Helsinki Rules, "beneficial" means "economically or socially




70. United Nations Water Conference, Report of the Conference, U.N. Doc. E/
Conf. 70/29, U.N. Sales No. E.77.IIA.12 (1977).
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resources. Also, the conference advised that studies be undertaken "to
explore the potential of groundwater basins, the use of aquifers as stor-
age and distribution systems, and the conjunctive use of surface and
subsurface resources to maximize efficacy and efficiency." 7 1 For
drought loss management, the conference recommended an intensifica-
tion of the exploration of groundwater.
72
Clearly there is an increased awareness in international law of the
transboundary nature of water resources. Nations, however, continue to
cling to older notions of territorial sovereignty. Because the two princi-
ples are diametrically opposed, laws can only embrace one principle or
the other. Therefore, this polarity has created a stalemate that impedes
the law from becoming accepted practice, a threshold requirement of
international law.
73
b. The Failure of Management Institutions to Confront the
Groundwater Problem
Legal institutions managing groundwater resources lack the power to
enforce their decisions. This inadequacy prevents proper resource man-
agement and dispute resolution, and ultimately impedes the formation
of consistent law. Because their decisions often go unheeded, these
institutions are unable to help create consistent practice.
There are few international agencies or institutions available to deal
with disputes arising over shared groundwater. 74 The legal authority
that exists between the U.S. and Mexico for assuring that both nations
receive their fair share of transboundary groundwater is "nearly non-
existent. '" 75 The IBWC, which was created by article 2 of the 1944
Treaty, would probably be the appropriate body to consider ground-
water disputes, but no agreement has as yet charged it with jurisdiction
over groundwater issues.76 It is important that the institution dealing
71. Id.
72. Id. at 10.
73. REST. 3RD, supra note 38, at § 102(2).
74. "Even with the increased attention to groundwater in modem legislation in
many countries, we are still faced, generally speaking, with unsatisfactory results. It is
more a case of non-management than of mismanagement." Hayton, supra note 43, at
66. Among some of these institutions are the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development(OECD) and the European Economic Community (EEC).
Smith, The United Nations and the Environment. Sometimes a Great Notion?, 19 TEXAs INT'L
L.J. 335, 355 (1984).
75. Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican Water Resources: Anticipat-
ing the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1114 (1982).
76. The IBWC consists of a Mexican section and a United States section. Treaty,
supra note 19, at art. 2. The primary purpose of the Commission was to oversee
"application of the treaty, the regulation and exercise of rights and duties which the
two governments assume under it, and the settlement of disputes which may arise out
of its observance and execution." Meyers, supra note 28, at 560-61. This Commis-
sion "is distinctive in that it exercises more than supervisory and advisory powers."
Ely & Wolman, Administration, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 130
(1967). Article 24 also charges the Commission with the responsibility to facilitate
completion of public works projects called for in the Treaty. Treaty, supra note 19, at
Vol. 24
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with shared boundary resources be international in character.7 7 An
agency run entirely by one state is prone to discriminate against the
interests of other states. This situation, however, requires an outside
body to dictate what a state does internally. Clearly many states disdain
infringement on their sovereignty by international management com-
missions and, as a result, these commissions have little power.78 For
instance, the Mexican section of the IBWC cannot assumejurisdiction or
control over public works located within the territorial limits of the U.S.
The U.S. section is similarly restricted. This applies even if the work is
international in character, such as that authorized by the 1944 Treaty. 79
Jurisdiction may only be obtained by the consent of the other state. This
means that in reality a self-interested body has jurisdiction over works
on each side.
In resolving disputes under the Treaty, if the commission members
are unable to agree, the commissioners must inform the U.S. Depart-
ment of State and Mexico's Ministry or Foreign Relations.8" Addition-
ally, the IBWC has no enforcement power. Any decision by the IBWC is
subject to review, including reversal, by the State Department and its
Mexican counterpart. 8 1 Clearly in this situation the sovereign retains a
great deal of power. This is most poignant in light of the fact that the
IBWC has more power than most other international agencies dealing
with groundwater. 8
2
c. Scientific Uncertainty Contributes to Vague Laws
The properties of groundwater are poorly understood, especially their
hydrolic connection to surface waters. 83 This frustrates dispute resolu-
tion and contributes to the vagueness and ineffectiveness of ground-
water laws.
Nations will not abide by a system in which their needs are not
addressed. Thus in order to create an effective system, it is necessary to
arts. 5-8. The jurisdiction of the Commission extends "to the limitrophe (border)
parts of the Rio Grande, Rio Bravo, and the Colorado River, to the land boundary
between the two countries, and to works located upon their common boundary, each
Section of the Commission retaining jurisdiction over that part of the works located
within the limits of its own country." Id. at art. 2.
77. See Utton, supra note 75, at 1110.
78. See generally Utton, supra note 38, at 3.
79. Treaty, supra note 19, at § 2.
80. Id. at art. 24.
81. Id.
82. See Utton, supra note 75, at 1114. The Helsinki Rules recommend forming
joint agencies for the resolution of disputes. Helsinki Rules, supra note 44, at art.
xxxi. Such agencies should survey the basin and formulate "plans or recommenda-
tions for the fullest and most efficient use thereof in the interest of all such States."
Id. If the joint commission is incapable of resolving the problem, then the contend-
ing states should seek the mediation of a third state or a qualified international
organization or person. Id. at art. xxxii. If mediation of a third state fails, the states
should form an ad hoc conciliation commission. Id. If this does not work, the rules
recommend submitting to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or the ICJ. Id at art. xxxiv.
83. See supra note 17; see also Hayton, supra note 43, at 69-75.
Cornell International Law Journal
allocate control over groundwater fairly. Fair allocation depends upon
having all the facts. The dispute between Mexico and the U.S. is a good
example of how scientific uncertainty may frustrate dispute resolution.
It is possible that the Mexican groundwater comes from a source that
does not originate in the All American Canal. In this case, relining the
Canal would have no effect upon the groundwater flowing to Mexico.
Even if the Canal is the source of the groundwater, it is not certain
whether the Canal has interfered with a natural groundwater aquifer or
whether it created the groundwater for Mexico when it brought water
from the Colorado River to Southern California.8 4 In order to resolve
this dispute, it will be necessary to determine which scenario is correct.
If the relining project has no effect on the groundwater flow, then no
dispute will exist to resolve. On the other hand, a finding that the All
American Canal interferes with a naturally flowing underground aquifer
may engender a different allocation than if the Canal artificially creates
the groundwater for Mexico.
D. General International Law
Although laws specifically relating to groundwater have not as yet devel-
oped, there are international environmental principles that would
receive widespread approval which may be applicable to groundwater
situations such as the dispute between the U.S. and Mexico.8 5
1. Reasonable and Equitable Share
States are only entitled to a "reasonable and equitable share of the ben-
eficial uses of a transboundary natural resource. '" 8 6 The standard of a
reasonable and equitable share under international law is still develop-
ing.8 7 The Helsinki Rules suggest a factor-analysis balancing test which
would take into account the interests of all affected states and their rela-
tive importance to each state.88
84. See supra note 17.
85. P. Magraw, Existing Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential,
Contextual, and Absolute Norms 15 (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
86. Id.
87. Ia- at n.30.
88. The Helsinki Rules enumerate the relevant factors:
(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited
to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the
drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution
of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular
existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(0 the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin
State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the eco-
nomic and social needs of each basin State;
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2. Duty Not To Harm Another State
A state is responsible under international law for activities within its
jurisdiction or control that cause significant injury in or to the territory
of another state.8 9 For example, in Trail Smelter,90 the U.S. sued Canada
for air pollution injury resulting from a Canadian smelting operation.
The arbitral tribunal held that "no State has the right to use or permit
the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear
and convincing evidence." 9 1 This duty of care is recognized in the Dec-
laration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
at Stockholm. Principle 21 of the Declaration charges states with "the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."9 2 However, the Declaration
also acknowledges states' "sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies .... -93 Thus,
the responsibility for damages is merely a limit on a state's ability to
exploit its own resources.
Lake Lanoux,9 4 an arbitration proceeding between France and Spain,
also illustrates that states have an affirmative obligation to prevent trans-
boundary harm. This case, however, goes a step further. The Interna-
tional Court of Justice held that all interests that may be affected must
be taken into account, even if they do not correspond to a right.9 5
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law similarly charges states
with an affirmative duty to regulate activities within their jurisdiction or
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the
basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin
States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied with-
out causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.
(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its impor-
tance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what
is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered
together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
Helsinki Rules, supra note 44, at art. V.
89. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905, 1963
(1941).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1965
92. REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT,
Stockholm, June 5-16, 1972, reprinted in I 1 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 416, 1420 (1972)
at principle 21 [hereinafter REPORT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT].
93. Id.
94. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), I.L.R. 101 (1957).
95. Id at 138-39.
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control so as not to harm other states. 9 6 A state is liable for significant
injury caused to the environment, persons, or property outside its juris-
diction or control.
Substantial support exists for the proposition that under interna-
tional law a state cannot cause injury to another state, even if the con-
duct occurs within its own territory. This duty includes not harming the
water resources of other states.
97
3. Duty To Protect the Environment
Under existing international documents, states must protect the global
environment. For instance, the Stockholm Convention on the Human
Environment declares that humankind "bears a solemn responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for future generations." s9 8 The
Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer calls upon states
to take appropriate measures "to protect human health and the environ-
ment against the adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human
activities which modify or are likely to modify the ozone layer." 99
Article 192 of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the
Sea 00 requires that states protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment, thereby limiting states' rights to exploit their own resources. 10 1
The convention also calls for cooperation on a global scale to preserve
and protect the marine environment and, in addition, calls upon states
to take all appropriate measures "to prevent, reduce, and control pollu-
tion of the marine environment from any source."1 0 2 These harsh obli-
96. REST. 3RD, supra note 40, at § 601.
(1) A state is obligated to take such measures as may be necessary, to the
extent practicable under the circumstances, to ensure that activities within its
jurisdiction or control
(a) conform to generally accepted international rules and standards for
the prevention, reduction, and control of injury to the environment
of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion; and
(b) are conducted so as not to cause significant injury to the environ-
ment of another state or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
(2) A state is responsible to all other states
(a) for any violation of its obligations under Subsection (l)(a), and
(b) for any significant injury, resulting from such violation, to the envi-
ronment of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
(3) A state is responsible for any significant injury, resulting from a violation
of its obligations under subsection (1), to the environment of another state or
to its property, or to persons or property within the state's territory or under
its jurisdiction or control.
97. See generally Lake Lanoux Arbitration, supra note 94.
98. REPORT ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, supra note 92, at principle 1.
99. Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer, 1985, 28 I.L.M. 1335,
at art. 2.
100. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, reprinted in Sweeny, Oliver & Leech, The International Legal System,
Doc. Supp. 317, 405 (1988).
101. Id. at art. 193.
102. Id. at art. 194(1).
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gations do, however, have limits. States are only required, for example,
to take measures that are in accordance with "the best practicable means
at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities."'
l0 3
Although all water resources are significant, global freshwater
resources in particular are diminishing.' 0 4 Because this planet cannot
support life without adequate freshwater, the protection of freshwater
resources is crucial to the global environment. Consequently, interna-
tional law must respond by regulating on a global scale activities that
affect the world's supply of freshwater.
II. Analysis
A. The 1944 Treaty and the 1973 Agreement between the U.S. and
Mexico
1. Basic Principles of Treaty Interpretation
International agreements create law for the states that are parties to
them. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
declares that treaties bind the countries that are parties to them,
10 5
much like a contract between individuals. Although a treaty may not
articulate customary international norms, it is law for its ratifying par-
ties. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
contains the basic principle for the interpretation of treaties: "A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose."' 1 6 Thus, the starting point for interpreting
treaties is the plain language of the agreement. However, specific con-
tents of particular provisions must be analyzed in relation to the object
and purpose of the treaty, as reflected in the agreement as a whole and
in additional instruments such as the preamble. 10 7 Article 31(3) of the
Vienna Convention also requires that subsequent relevant practice be
taken into account.10 8 Drafting history may be relevant to confirm the
meaning derived from textual analysis or when the text is ambiguous or
leads to an absurd result. 10 9
2. Application of the 1944 Treaty
It is likely that the disputed groundwater originally came from the Colo-
rado River. 1 10 The only treaty between the U.S. and Mexico that gov-
103. Id.
104. The global population explosion has caused increased consumption of fresh-
water. This trend, combined with pollution, has greatly diminished global freshwater
resources. Utton, supra note 38, at 2; see also Teclaff & Teclaff, supra note 51.
105. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 26, reprinted at
246.
106. Id., reprinted at 247.
107. Id. at art. 31(2), reprinted at 248.
108. Id.
109. Id. at art. 32, reprinted at 248.
110. See supra note 17.
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ems the Colorado River is the 1944 Treaty."'I The Treaty specifically
states that Mexico is to receive a maximum of 1.7 million acre feet from
the Colorado River, only 375,000 of which need be from the Canal. 112
Although it appears that Mexico receives more than its allotment,
underground flow is not considered part of Mexico's allotment under
the Treaty. 1"5 Consequently, the U.S. is not delivering more water to
Mexico than is required under the Treaty because the Treaty does not
address groundwater. The intent of the Treaty was to apportion only
surface waters. 114 Thus, the Treaty is not relevant to groundwater
disputes.
3. Application of the 1973 Agreement
As stated above, the 1973 Agreement limits new development or modifi-
cation of present developments in the border area that might adversely
affect surface or groundwater resources of either the U.S. or Mexico. 15
The U.S. project to reline the bottom of the Canal seems to fall under
this limitation because it is in the border area, and if completed would in
all likelihood dry up Mexico's groundwater.
Proper treaty interpretation, however, requires looking at the whole
agreement and the context in which it was created."16 The purpose of
the Agreement was to correct the increased salt content in the water
going to Mexico from the Colorado River. 117 The Agreement says
nothing about who has rights to the groundwater. It only limits the
groundwater that can be pumped in Arizona."18 This limit is only an
interim arrangement until the governments reach "a comprehensive
agreement on the groundwater in the border area."' 1 9 Because the
Agreement is designed to deal only with pollution and admits that there
111. Seesupra note 18.
112. Treaty, supra note 19, art. 15.
113. Utton, supra note 41, at 158 n.8.
114. See Treaty, supra note 19, at preamble. The proclamation introducing the
Treaty proceeds in part:
to fix and delimit the rights of the two countries with respect to the waters of
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from
Fort Quitman, Texas, United States of America, to the Gulf of Mexico, in
order to obtain the most complete and satisfactory utilization thereof, have
resolved to conclude a treaty
As one can see, this only deals with surface waters contained in the channels of the
two rivers. See El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F. Supp. 379, 387 (1983) (the court refused
to apply the 1906 compact to groundwater because the Treaty made no mention of
groundwater).
115. Agreement, supra note 19, at § 6. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
116. Vienna Convention, supra note 21, art. 31, reprinted at 248.
117. The Agreement's title is "Permanent and Definitive Solution to the Interna-
tional Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River." The first page of the text of
the agreement approving IBWC Minute 242 states that the two commissioners have
come together "in order to incorporate in a minute the joint recommendations...
for a permanent and definitive solution of the international problem of the salinity of
the Colorado River."
118. Agreement, supra note 19, at § 5.
119. Id
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is no arrangement for groundwater, developments that "adversely
affect" means only those activities that would pollute or make the water
unusable. Lining the bottom of the Canal would do neither; conse-
quently, it is outside the scope of the Agreement. It is merely a conser-
vation measure. 120 Mexico would still have the amount for which it
contracted under the 1944 Treaty.
Principles of treaty interpretation also require looking at subse-
quent relevant practice because it may reflect the parties' understanding
of an agreement. The U.S. has never objected to Mexico's use of
groundwater. This silence on the part of the U.S. may indicate that it
believes that the 1944 Treaty and the Agreement allow Mexico to use
the groundwater. Then again, necessity creates the law. 121 The U.S.
may not have objected simply because water scarcity was not yet a prob-
lem. The U.S. may not have foreseen such conflicts with Mexico. With-
out more, such as a statement from Congress, it is impossible to
determine whether or not the U.S. has ever recognized Mexican rights
to groundwater.
It appears that neither the Treaty nor the Agreement addresses
groundwater allocation, and therefore they do not definitively deter-
mine whether or not Mexico has a cause of action. When treaties fail to
address an issue, it is appropriate to fill in the gaps with customary and
general principles of international law.'
22
B. Application of Customary and General Principles of International
Law
Global environmental law relating to water is in a state of flux.' 23 New
notions of global unity and shared resources have not yet been success-
ful in replacing old notions of territorial sovereignty. Applying either
principle to the groundwater dispute between the U.S. and Mexico
results in opposite outcomes.
1. Application of the Principle of Territorial Sovereignty
Even if the Canal drastically interferes with groundwater that naturally
flows to Mexico, the U.S. can justify its actions on the basis of territorial
sovereignty. According to general notions of territorial sovereignty,
riparian states can do whatever they want with water and public works
located within their territory. In the dispute with Mexico, the U.S. is the
upper riparian user and, therefore, is in an advantageous position. As
the first landowner to overlie the groundwater, it can use the water
according to its own needs without regard for the needs of downstream
120. Lining is merely a conservation measure which will not pollute the water. See
Bonanza, supra note 2, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
121. See Hayton, supra note 43, at 60.
122. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 38(1), 1983 U.N.Y.B. 1334, U.N.
Sales No. , reprinted in Sweeny, Oliver & Leech, The International Legal System,
Doc. Supp. 29, 37 (1988).
123. See supra pp. 404-10.
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users such as Mexico. In light of this principle, Mexico should not have
allowed itself to become reliant on the groundwater when it knew that
the groundwater originated in the U.S.'
24
2. Application of Transboundaiy Principles
In the face of U.S. claims as an upper riparian user, there are a number
of counter-arguments. Growing awareness of diminishing natural
resources and increasing environmental deterioration have tempered
traditional approaches to transboundary issues. 125 Nations are begin-
ning to accept transboundary harm as a cause of action, 126 thereby limit-
ing the principle of territorial sovereignty and creating new
international responsibilities.1 27 As a result, states are only entitled to a
reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial use of a transboundary
resource. Therefore, the U.S. cannot develop a canal lining which
would dry up all or most of the groundwater that normally flows to Mex-
ico because this is more than its reasonable and equitable share.
Likewise, a state may not cause injury to another state from activi-
ties within its own borders. Trail Smelter, 12 8 discussed above, recognized
this obligation with respect to injury from pollution. The result is the
same, however, whether the resource is unusable because it becomes
polluted or because it becomes nonexistent. Were the U.S. to complete
the Canal project, Mexico's water would disappear, bringing ruin to the
economic and social structure of Northern Mexico. Because the project
causing harm to Mexico is entirely within the territorial jurisdiction and
control of the U.S., the project violates the U.S. responsibility to ensure
that activities within its borders do not substantially harm other states.
The Lake Lanoux arbitral tribunal held that "account must be taken
of all interests ... even if they do not correspond to a right." 129 The
U.S. has allowed Mexico to use the disputed water without objection for
quite a while and, consequently, Mexico's northern economy now
depends upon this water. It would be unjust to cut Mexico off from this
groundwater after it has grown to rely upon it, especially in light of the
fact that the U.S. made no objection to this use. Therefore, even if Mex-
ico does not have a legal claim to the water, its interests must be taken
into account.
124. The U.S. is a large proponent of territorial sovereignty for all nations. In
accordance with this position, the U.S. has studiously avoided situations where it
would have to judge the actions of other states. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act outlines the rare exceptions when a foreign state can be haled into a U.S. court.
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441,
1602-1611 (1988). If a foreign state's actions fall under one of the exceptions, that
state may still never see a U.S. courtroom because the act of state doctrine holds that
the U.S. should not sit in judgment upon acts of a government of another country.
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
125. See supra pp. 306-08.
126. See supra pp. 311-12.
127. REST. 3RD, supra note 40, at § 102(2).
128. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
129. I.L.R. 101, 138-39 (1957).
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Mexico may also argue that the water in the Canal has become a
shared resource. Canals, like rivers, are in principle subject to the terri-
torial sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state or states which they sepa-
rate or traverse.1 30 The groundwater from the All American Canal
flows into Mexico, traversing international boundaries. It follows that
Mexico has some jurisdiction over this water because it comes from a
canal that traverses more than one state. Under this view, the U.S. can-
not appropriate Mexico's groundwater any more than it could legally
appropriate Mexico's share of the Colorado or Rio Grande rivers.
Territorial concerns, however, should be balanced against conser-
vational interests. The Canal project is a conservation measure, not
merely a diversion scheme, because the relining will save some of the
groundwater that would be lost on the way to Mexico. Because the
planet is rapidly losing freshwater resources, it is important to
encourage water conservation measures in order to protect the global
environment. Therefore, any allocation of groundwater between the
two countries should take the U.S. conservation effort into consideration
by allocating a greater share to the U.S. than it would have obtained
without the relining project.
It is unclear what solution international law would currently dictate.
Because absolute territorial control is an antiquated argument,1 3 ' the
U.S. cannot rely on this doctrine. Precedent indicates that the U.S. has a
duty to take Mexico's interests into account. Territorial rights, however,
cannot be completely ignored because territorial sovereignty is still an
important doctrine in international law.13 2 The best approach to the
dispute requires a balancing of the extent of the harm to Mexico against
the territorial rights and conservation measures of the U.S.
HI. Application of U.S. Law
Although international law fails to provide a definitive answer to the
groundwater dispute, U.S. domestic law provides further guidance on
the appropriate resolution. Internal policies and specific laws of a par-
ticular state may reveal the state's position on an international issue.
Such inquiry is especially relevant when the subject matter of the domes-
tic legislation is closely related to the subject matter of the international
problem. 13 3 International legal scholars also look to federal systems for
guidance in areas not addressed by international law. 134
130. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 275 (3d ed. 1979).
131. Frownfelter, The International Component of Teaw Water Law, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J.
481, 502 (1986).
132. See F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text.
133. Hayton, The Formation of the Customary Rules of International Drainage Basin Law,
in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 847 (1967).
134. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941).
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A. Prior Appropriation
1. Background
Prior appropriation is the predominant doctrine used to determine
water rights in the arid western region of the U.S. 13 5 This doctrine pro-
vides that water rights, once established, constitute interests independ-
ent of the land and may be sold to another party for use on other
land.' 3 6 Prior appropriation is usually applied to surface water but has
been applied to groundwater as well.13 7 The doctrine creates a hierar-
chy of usage whereby the first water users have seniority and can use the
water on non-riparian land.13 8 However, the owner must use the water
or lose the privilege.139 In addition the owner must use the water bene-
ficially. 140 Arizona and New Mexico have adopted this theory.
141
Texas and California, the only other states sharing the Mexican bor-
der, supplement prior appropriation with a "reasonable use" theory,1
4 2
which entitles landowners to the reasonable use of water on their land.
Downstream owners cannot enjoin upper riparian owners from using
the water unless they are not receiving enough water for their needs or
the upstream owner is substantially interfering with their needs.143 Rea-
sonable use may conflict with prior appropriation when a state incorpo-
rates both doctrines. Under prior appropriation the interest in water
can be severed from the land while under reasonable use it is part of the
land. A situation could arise where someone buys land on which the
water has already been appropriated. States that incorporate both prior
appropriation and reasonable use theories have established administra-
tive boards to resolve such conflicts.
14 4
135. Clyde, Adapting to the Changing Demand for Water Use Through Continued Refine-
ment of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine: An Alternative Approach to Wholesale Reallocation,
29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 435 (1989).
136. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Col. 443 (1882); Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods,
Inc., 513 P.2d 627, 631 (Idaho 1973).
137. Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 79 (N. Mex. 1962).
138. Non-riparian land is land not physically connected to the water supply. "An
appropriator may change his or her place of use, nature of use, or point of diversion
of his or her water right." Clyde, supra note 135, at 437. The prior appropriation
doctrine grew from the custom and usage of early mining camps and irrigated farms
of the western United States, where water was sometimes needed miles away from its
source. Id. at 435; Caponera & Alheritiere, supra note 42, at 36.
139. "To be beneficial, the use must promote economic activities, and generally
there must be actual diversion and consumption of water." Clyde, supra note 135, at
436.
140. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 185 (1982); Washington v. Oregon,
27 U.S. 517, 527 (1936); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943).
141. Mclellen v.Jantzen, 547 P.2d 494 (Ariz. App. 1976); Martinez v. Cook, 244
P.2d 134 (N.M. Ct. App. 1952).
142. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, (Cal. 1980); In re Water Rights of Brazos
III, 746 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex. 1988).
143. Dumont v. Keilogg, 29 Mich. 420 (1874).
144. See cases cited supra note 142.
Vol. 24
1991 Water Resources and International Law
2. The Extension of Prior Appropriation to Groundwater
The states contiguous to Mexico are the heaviest groundwater users in
the U.S.' 45 These states, however, have completely different ground-
water laws.
In 1980, the Arizona legislature adopted the Arizona Groundwater
Code, which extends the doctrine of prior appropriation only to water
flowing in streams or definite underground channels. The code omits
reference to percolating groundwater, or water that does not flow in a
definite stream, such as rain seepage. An owner's use of percolating
water is limited only by what is reasonable.
146
California, on the other hand, has a system of correlative rights.
Surface owners of common aquifers (underground water basins) own
the water jointly, and each is allowed a proportionate quantity of water
based upon the amount of surface ownership or use. 147 Surplus water
not needed on basin lands can be used on other land; however, any use
that lowers the water table is prohibited. Prior appropriation doctrine
comes into play when water is to be applied elsewhere than to the over-
lying land.
148
One of the first states to establish a groundwater management sys-
tem, 149 New Mexico recognizes that prior appropriation applies to sur-
face as well as groundwaters.15 0 In addition, water rights are
conditioned upon actual use so that unused rights revert to the public.
New Mexico's statutory system regulates new water rights by requiring
application, notice and hearing, and by providing for detailed record
keeping prior to issuing usage permits.'15
Texas has the least-developed groundwater regime of all the states
contiguous to Mexico. Because ownership of groundwater in Texas is
absolute, landowners are entitled to unlimited withdrawals.' 52 Texas
expects voluntary conservation, an unrealistic expectation in a competi-
tive society capable of drilling more and deeper wells. 153 As a result of
this regime, the groundwater level in Texas has declined drastically.'
54
145. Utton, Overview, 22 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 735, 741 (1982).
146. Collier v. Ariz. Dept. of Water Resources, 722 P.2d. 363 (Ariz. App. 1986).
147. Clark, Overview of Groundwater Law and Institutions in United States Border States,
22 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 1007, 1011 (1982).
148. Hayton, supra note 43, at 63-64.
149. Clark, supra note 147, at 1012.
150. "There does not exist one body of substantive law relating to appropriation
of stream water and another body of law relating to appropriation of underground
water.... The substantive rights, when obtained are identical." Albuquerque v.
Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73, 79 (N. Mex. 1962).
151. Clark, supra note 147, at 1012.
152. Johnson, Texan Groundwater Law: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 1017, 1018 (1982).
153. Clark, supra note 147, at 1010.
154. The Winter Garden area of South Texas has experienced water-level
declines in excess of 240 ft. in the past 20 years, and water levels in the Trin-
ity Group aquifer in the Dallas-Fort Worth area have declined more than 400
feet during the past 25 years.
319
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One reason the U.S. is not willing to enter into a groundwater treaty
with Mexico at this time 15 5 involves problems of federalism. The four
states bordering Mexico are not only the heaviest groundwater users in
the country, but all four have different and often conflicting ground-
water laws. Creating a workable treaty would necessarily involve con-
forming the various state laws. However, this may present constitutional
problems because it requires that the federal government dictate to the
states their internal groundwater law. 156
B. Equitable Apportionment
1. Background
Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that
governs disputes between states concerning rights to use water of an
interstate stream. 157 It is a flexible doctrine that requires consideration
of many factors. 15 8 Prior appropriation is the guiding principle when all
states that are parties to a dispute recognize it internally. However,
prior appropriation is not the exclusive factor in determining equitable
Around El Paso, water levels have shown a marked decline as the Cities of
El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, have pumped more water than is
recharged to the Hueco Bolson. It is simply a matter of time before the aqui-
fer is either depleted or invaded by the underlying salt water.
Id. (quoting The Cross Section High Plains Underground Water Conservation Dist.
No. 1, at 3 (May 1981)).
155. Telephone interview with Counsel at the IBWC (Feb. 7, 1990).
156. However, it is not unheard of for treaties to ignore federalism problems
regarding resources within a state. In Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the
U.S. had entered into a treaty with Great Britain to protect migratory birds that trav-
elled between the two countries. The treaty prohibited the "killing, capturing, or
selling any of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty, except as per-
mitted by regulations." Id. at 431. Missouri claimed that the treaty and the accompa-
nying regulations were "void as an interference with the rights reserved to the
States." Id. at 432. Missouri asserted title to the migratory birds found there. The
Supreme Court allowed the treaty to pre-empt Missouri law. "Wild birds are not in
the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole
foundation of the State's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that
yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another state, and in a week a thou-
sand miles away . . ." Id. at 434. The Court continued, holding that matters of
national interest are particularly suited to treaty administration: "Here a national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by
national action ... But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for
any powers to deal with." Id.
The same argument can be made for groundwater. Such water is transitory.
Today it may be in California or Arizona, but tomorrow it may be in Mexico. Potable
fresh water is a diminishing resource. Therefore it would be in both national and
international interests to have a single coherent treaty dealing with the shared
groundwater.
157. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982). The U.S. Constitution
extends to the Supreme Court the power to resolve disputes between states. See
U.S. CONsT. art. III § 2. Therefore, there is no unconstitutional infringement when
the Supreme Court applies equitable apportionment to resolve disputes over water
rights between states.
158. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
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apportionment. 15 9 Rather, the just apportionment of interstate waters
depends "upon the pertinent laws of the contending States and all other
relevant facts."' 60 The Court has subsequently defined these relevant
factors.
In Washington v. Oregon,' 6 ' the Court held that wasteful or inefficient
use would not be protected.' 6 2 In Nebraska v. Wyoming, 163 the Court
retained prior appropriation, but modified it to protect junior users
whose economies are dependent upon the later appropriation. 64 Thus,
a court will not strictly apply the rule of priority where it would work
more harm on junior users than it would benefit senior users.
In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Court expanded the doctrine of prior
appropriation to encompass other concerns besides protecting less
developed economies. Although the Court held that prior appropria-
tion is important, other relevant factors include:
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the sev-
eral sections of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent
of established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical effect of
wasteful uses on downstream areas, the damage to upstream areas as
compared to the benefits to the downstream areas if a limitation is
imposed on the former.165
In Colorado v. New MexCico, 16 6 the Court severely manipulated the
doctrine of prior appropriation by introducing two new factors. The
Court stated:
[w]hile the equities supporting the protection of established senior uses
are substantial, it is appropriate to consider additional factors relevant to
ajust apportionment, such as the conservation measures available to both
states here and the extent to which these conservation measures will off-
set harm from the diversion.
167
Additionally, the Court held that it is appropriate to consider the harm
to competing states.1 6 8 The state seeking the diversion has the burden
of proving that the benefits of the diversion outweigh the harms. 169
2. Application of Equitable Apportionment to the Groundwater Dispute with
Mexico
Strict application of prior appropriation would be unfair in this situa-
tion. The U.S. is far more developed than Mexico and has historically
159. Id- at 618.
160. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931).
161. 297 U.S. 517 (1936).
162. Id. at 527-28.
163. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
164. Id. at 618. Ajunior user is a latecomer to water use who therefore has a lower
priority in the hierarchy of established water uses.
165. Id.
166. 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
167. Id. at 188.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 187 n.13.
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been able to use more water. Consequently, prior appropriation would
entitle the U.S. to substantially more water, leaving Mexico without
enough water for its needs.
Because the U.S. seeks the diversion, it has the burden of proving
that the benefits of the Canal project to the U.S. would outweigh the
harm to Mexico. At first glance, the balance would seem to favor Mex-
ico. Mexico is ajunior user whose economy depends upon the water,
170
and the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine of prior appro-
priation to protect less developed countries that depend on disputed
water.1 7 1 Also, the Supreme Court has dictated that it is proper to take
into consideration the nature and extent of the established usage. Mex-
ico uses this water in all facets of its society: domestic, agricultural, and
industrial. Diminishing or drying up the water would ruin these aspects
of Mexican society.17 2 California, on the other hand, only intends to use
this water for future development.'7 While future use is one factor to
consider' 74 in balancing the equities, it is less equitable to ruin a vibrant
economy in one region than to prevent future development in another.
A balance of the equities under the doctrine of equitable apportion-
ment favors Mexico because its economy is predicated upon the contin-
ued use of the water. On the other hand, it is in the general public
interest and the interest of the environment to conserve natural
resources. One criteria laid out by the Supreme Court in Colorado v. New
Mexico is the ability of one of the states involved to conserve water. 175
Conservation affects the balance of whether or not to divert the water.
The fact that the U.S. proposes the project as a conservation measure
weighs in favor of the project. The U.S. may be able to save enough
water from the project to make it reasonable to reapportion the 1944
Treaty and give Mexico more water.
Conclusion
Given the nebulous nature of international groundwater law, the dispute
between Mexico and the U.S. will be difficult to resolve. The treaties do
not address groundwater, and international law contains such diametri-
cally opposed principles that both sides can make compelling argu-
ments. This situation illuminates the need for greater structure in the
international groundwater regime. Many crucial natural resources such
as groundwater traverse state lines, yet international law fails to reflect
this reality in any definitive way. Nations need to be weaned away from
notions of territorial sovereignty over natural resources towards a more
170. Canal Project, supra note 1, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
171. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
172. Canal Project, supra note 1, § 1, at 3, col. 1.
173. Id
174. "The flexible doctrine of equitable apportionment clearly extends to a state's
claim to divert water for future uses." Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 190
(1982).
175. Id. at 188.
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global view. International institutions that deal with shared ground-
water should be given more power, and new institutions should be
formed, facilitating dispute resolution and the formation of adequate
laws. To help clear up scientific uncertainty that is presently clouding
efforts to allocate groundwater, nations that share groundwater
resources should exchange information regarding the nature of the
water. Additionally, the international community should look to domes-
tic laws, especially of countries with federal systems, for ideas on how to
resolve groundwater conflicts.
As the world population outstrips diminishing resources, similar
conflicts are already arising between nations. For example, Egypt
recently temporarily blocked a loan to Ethiopia from the African Devel-
opment Bank because it was concerned that the loan would finance a
project which would consume too much water from the Blue Nile.'
76
Turkey's diversion of the Euphrates to fill a new reservoir has disrupted
water use in Syria and Iraq. 17 7 It is important that international law
develop in this area as quickly as possible, before more serious disputes
lead to the use of force as an unsatisfactory alternative to the rule of law.
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